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The BAROMETER is a student bi-weekly newspaper for the 
exchange of ideas and information concerning the development 
and improvement of the professional environment at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Items of interest, papers, 
and articles of interest to the students, staff, and faculty 
as a whole are solicited by the editors. 
"The Navy has been ordered in unmistakable language 
to accept a YF-16/YF-17 type airplane, whether they 
like it or not, and have been told not to call it a 
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EDITORS COMMENT: In this article we have two opposing views-both righ~ahd both wr~g: 
of Navy fighters. The author is CAPT Gerald G. O'Rourke, USN, RET, who headed the Navy 
Fighter Study Number 4 which led to the VFAX requirement before he retired. He has 
extensive experience in Naval Aviation and now works for a consulting group in McLean, 
Virginia. In his article he refers to two very fine articles which appeared in previous 
issues of Armed Forces Journal International. This article also appeared in The Journal 
in November 1974. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: TWO VIEWS ON NAVY FIGHTERS 
"The Navy's VFAX/Lightweight fighter decision is near and it's time for a close look 
at the issues involved. In your April 74 issue Mr. George Spangenberg, 'Dean Emeritus' 
of the Naval Air Systems Command, produced a fine article entitled 'Cheap Fighters-The 
Impossible Dream.' In the May issue, CDR Ernie Waller, USN(RET) blasted George's view-
point with 'Fighter Aircraft-'The Cheap Shot' Revisited.' In essence, George had repeated 
his long held opinion that lightweight fighters are 'Do-nothing airplanes', and Ernie 
launched off into a standard fighter pilot's emotional plea for the hottest dog in the sky. 
George Spangenberg is an acknowledged expert whose deeds and exploits have carved a 
niche for him in the annals of Naval Aviation history. He attracted particular fame for 
his honesty, integrity, forthright opinions, and a charming penchant for hollering 
'B--S--' at fighter pilots, systems analysts, Admirals or Senators, at the height of 
some heated professional debate. More often than not, George has been later proven 
accurate in these matters. Over the years, his firmness and hard-line opinions amid an 
otherwise placid bureaucracy fostered the dedicated spirit which produced naval aircraft 
like the F-4 Phantom and the A-7 Corsair, as well as a host of others. 
Ernie Waller, on the other hand, is an 'operator'. He flew lots of airplanes from 
lots of carrier decks, in fair weather and foul, at night and in sunshine, in peace and 
in war. He's often been shot at by guns, by missiles and verbally, and he's survived. 
His opinions are important when it comes to fighter aircraft, not so much because they 
are his, but more because there are many other fine operational fighter pilots who share 
these views. 
In the opinion of this writer, both George and Ernie are right in many respects, but, 
unfortunately, both wrong in their final conclusions. 
Ernie is right when he pleads for a smaller, lighter, more dependable and reliable, 
highly maneuverable fighter. We certainly need those qualities in any aircraft that may 
be called upon to dogfight in sunny skies. George is right when he avers that we must 
always give our fighter pilots some edge of advantage. He points out that carriers are 
built for offense, that Navy fighters must carry the fight into the enemy's backyard and 
must overcome intrinsic fuel, weight, and size disadvantages through tactics training 
and weapo~ry. Ernie is right whe he reviews the problems of positive visual identification 
in actual combat. No Navy fighter pilot wants to pull the trigger on an unidentified and 
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unseen target-the 'enemy pilot' he hits may well be his shipmate, or his Air Force counter-
part. Fighter pilots tend to be extreme cynics about utopian Rules of Engagement and 
Command and Control of Airspace. You have to have lived through a few dofight melees 
to properly appreciate the fantastic degree of confusion which they generate. George 
is right when he talks about the costs of military airplanes. In essence, he says that 
none of them are cheap, simply because we seldom build enough of them rapidly enough to 
benefit from the learning curves of mass production, or to amortize the heavy initial 
investment in development, test and evaluation which inevitably preceeds any production run. 
Ernie is wrong, however, when he presumes that the Naval Aviation's future roles will 
include enough dog-fighting in bright sunlight to make a specialized hot rod fighter worth 
its salt within the Carrier Air Wing. In both Korea and Vietna, carriers enjoyed sea 
sanctuaries in which they subsituted for land bases. The fact that the carriers seFved 
so well in this role is a testimonial to their inherent flexibility, mobility, and 
versatility. It is even a greater testimonial to the truly unique men who made them 
work in this fashion. But it's not the way they either should or will be used in the 
future, when the first order of business will be the Soviet Navy, the second order the 
blackading or opening of a sea lane of commerce somewhere, and the third laying aerial 
seige to some enemy ashore, and when any nation, small or large, may have a fleet of 
missile-firing speedboats handy. 
George is wrong when he speaks of money as a criterion for cheap and expensive airplanes. 
It's really not the money that counts-its the damned maintainability, reliability and 
readiness to fight that makes the difference. Expensive airplanes are complex airplanes, 
and complex airplanes, over the past 10 to 15 year, have been the bane of our existence. 
The costs of keeping a stable of these complex machines in fighting trim is astronomical-
in terms of people. Our maintenance and support people have repeatedly fallen behind 
the heavy demands which these complex, sophisticated systems have made. The Navy Supply 
System, bound up on the red tape of its own space age bureaucratic computerdom, has rarely 
been able to stay apace with ever-increasing demands for high cost, one-of-a-kind spare 
parts for the sophisticated systems. Aircraft designers seem to expect navy enlisted 
technicians to be super-smart and super-motivated, and to overcome all technical design 
deficiencies with some great new innovative operational trick. It just doen't work that 
way any more. While the military draft was in effect, Naval Aviation heavily relied 
on the intelligence and dedication of a bunch of kids who had to put in Service time but 
felt the Navy a better deal than the Army. With the absence of the draft, compounded 
by the increasing internal competition for talent from the surface Navy, as they rely 
more and more upon complex and sophisticated systems, Naval Aviation is bound to see a 
reduction in quality of their skilled enlisted men. Semi-skilled 19 year old mechanics 
and technicians can't keep the fancy systems going. The only answer to the personnel 
problem is to build the systems better in the first place, design them not to break so 
often, test them in realistic environments and fix them. Then test them some more and 
fix them again, and never stop the process until they're ready for the graveyard. This 
costs money, but not more than it costs not to test and fix, and far less than it costs 
launch off on a new plane before extracting the most out of the ones already on hand. 
, od example is the FIIIB/F4J history. If just a few of those megabucks that were 
n. llr cd down the FlllB rathole had been put instead into refining and fine tuning the 
. . eries, both Navy and Air Force would have been far better off in Vietnam. 
J rll ie is right when he states that a 'cheap' YF-16 would provide more sorties per day 
than an expensive fighter. This has certainly been the case in the past. He is quite 
wrong when he starts bandying dollar costs around and thereby creates 'savings'. Neither 
, ~ YF - 16 nor the F-4 examples he cites can begin to do the job that an F-14 can do. The 
C0S LS and maintenance requirements of the F-14 are grossly overstated, the costs for the 
J: ·· 4 are understated by a substantial margin and the YF-16 costs are at best paper promises. 
r, . orge is absolutely right when he says that the YF-16/YF-17 type of hot rod cannot 
~ ,L· stitute for an F-14 in Navy missions. It just does not make good operational sense to 
have fighters which are deficient in range or weapons or both. However, George does not 
use the right assumptions when he gets into the cost/effectiveness arguments. If the 
light fighter selected for comparison is no good at any other mission, such as light 
attack, and if it is only purchased in quantities of 400 or so, then it scores very low 
on any cost/effectiveness basis. However, if the Light Fighter selected for comparison 
is a bit larger than the YF-16/YF-17 types, if it carries a Sparrow type weapons system, 
and if it (or a close cousin variant) can also be seen as the A-7 replacement in the 
future, then the cost/effectiveness arguments tilt heavily in its favor. This is precisely 
what the Navy is presently striving for in its VFAX program. 
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EDITORS COMMENT: In this article we have two opposing views-both right and both wrong-
of Navy fighters. The author is CAPT Gerald G. O'Rourke, USN, RET, who headed the Navy 
Fighter Study Number 4 which led to the VFAX requirement before he retired. He has 
extensive experience in Naval Aviation and now works for a consulting group in McLean, 
Virginia. In his article he refers to two very fine articles which appeared in previous 
issues of Armed Forces Journal International. This article also appeared in The Journal 
in November 1974. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: TWO VIEWS ON NAVY FIGHTERS 
"The Navy's VFAX/Lightweight fighter decision is near and it's time for a close look 
at the issues involved. In your April 74 issue Mr. George Spangenberg, 'Dean Emeritus' 
of the Naval Air Systems Command, produced a fine article entitled 'Cheap Fighters-The 
Impossible Dream.' In the May issue, CDR Ernie Waller, USNCRET) blasted George's view-
point with 'Fighter Aircraft-'The Cheap Shot' Revisited.' In essence, George had repeated 
his long held opinion that lightweight fighters are 'Do-nothing airplanes', and Ernie 
launched off into a standard fighter pilot's emotional plea for the hottest dog in the sky. 
George Spangenberg is an acknowledged expert whose deeds and exploits have carved a 
niche for him in the annals of Naval Aviation history. He attracted particular fame for 
his honesty, integrity, forthright opinions, and a charming penchant for hollering 
'B--S--' at fighter pilots, systems analysts, Admirals or Senators, at the height of 
some heated professional debate. More often than not, George has been later proven 
accurate in these matters. Over the years, his firmness and hard-line opinions amid an 
otherwise placid bureaucracy fostered the dedicated spirit which produced naval aircraft 
like the F-4 Phantom and the A-7 Corsair, as well as a host of others. 
Ernie Waller, on the other hand, is an 'operator'. He flew lots of airplanes from 
lots of carrier decks, in fair weather and foul, at night and in sunshine, in peace and 
in war. He's often been shot at by guns, by missiles and verbally, and he's survived. 
-His opinions are important when it comes to fighter aircraft, not so much because they 
are his, but more because there are many other fine operational fighter pilots who share 
these views. 
In the opinion of this writer, both George and Ernie are right in many respects, but, 
unfortunately, both wrong in their final conclusions. 
Ernie is right when he pleads for a smaller, lighter, more dependable and reliable, 
highly maneuverable fighter. We certainly need those qualities in any aircraft that may 
be called upon to dogfight in sunny skies. George is right when he avers that we must 
always give our fighter pilots some edge of advantage. He points out that carriers are 
built for offense, that Navy fighters must carry the fight into the enemy's backyard and 
must overcome intrinsic fuel, weight, and size disadvantages through tactics training 
and weaponry. Ernie is right whe he reviews the problems of positive visual identification 
in actual combat. No Navy fighter pilot wants to pull the trigger on an unidentified and 
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unseen target-the 'enemy pilot' he hits may well be his shipmate, or his Air Force counter-
part. Fighter pilots tend to be extreme cynics about utopian Rules of Engagement and 
Command and Control of Airspace. You have to have lived through a few dofight melees 
to properly appreciate the fantastic degree of confusion which they generate. George 
is right when he talks about the costs of military airplanes. In essence, he says that 
none of them are cheap, simply because we seldom build enough of them rapidly enough to 
benefit from the learning curves of mass production, or to amortize the heavy initial 
investment in development, test and evaluation which inevitably preceeds any production run. 
Ernie is wrong, however, when he presumes that the Naval Aviation's future roles will 
include enough dog-fighting in bright sunlight to make a specialized hot rod fighter worth 
its salt within the Carrier Air Wing. In both Korea and Vietna, carriers enjoyed sea 
sanctuaries in which they subsituted for land bases. The fact that the carriers se~ved 
so well in this role is a testimonial to their inherent flexibility, mobility, and 
versatility. It is even a greater testimonial to the truly unique men who made them 
work in this fashion. But it's not the way they either should or will be used in the 
future, when the first order of business will be the Soviet Navy, the second order the 
blackading or opening of a sea lane of commerce somewhere, and the third laying aerial 
seige to some enemy ashore, and when any nation, small or large, may have a fleet of 
missile-firing speedboats handy. 
George is wrong when he speaks of money as a criterion for cheap and expensive airplanes. 
It's really not the money that counts-its the damned maintainability, reliability and 
readiness to fight that makes the difference. Expensive airplanes are complex airplanes, 
and complex airplanes, over the past 10 to 15 year, have been the bane of our existence. 
The costs of keeping a stable of these complex machines in fighting trim is astronomical-
in terms of people. Our maintenance and support people have repeatedly fallen behind 
the heavy demands which these complex, sophisticated systems have made. The Navy Supply 
System, bound up on the red tape of its Own space age bureaucratic computerdom, has rarely 
been able to stay apace with ever-increasing demands for high cost, one-of-a-kind spare 
parts for the sophisticated systems. Aircraft designers seem to expect navy enlisted 
technicians to be super-smart and super-motivated, and to overcome all technical design 
deficiencies with some great new innovative operational trick. It just doen't work that 
way any more. While the military draft was in effect, Naval Aviation heavily relied 
on the intelligence and dedication of a bunch of kids who had to put in Service time but 
felt the Navy a better deal than the Army. With the absence of the draft, compounded 
by the increasing internal competition for talent from the surface Navy, as they rely 
more and more upon complex and sophisticated systems, Naval Aviation is bound to see a 
reduction in quality of their skilled enlisted men. Semi-skilled 19 year old mechanics 
and technicians can't keep the fancy systems going. The only answer to the personnel 
problem is to build the systems better in the first place, design them not to break so 
often, test them in realistic environments and fix them. Then test them some more and 
fix them again, and never stop the process until they're ready for the graveyard. This 
lasts money, but not more than it costs not to test and fix, and far less than it costs 
launch off on a new plane before extracting the most out of the ones already on hand. 
l ad example is the FIIIB/F4J history. If just a few of those megabucks that were 
n, ur cd down the FlIIB rathole had been put instead into refining and fine tuning the 
. . eries, both Navy and Air Force would have been far better off in Vietnam. 
I rI, i e is right when he states that a 'cheap' YF-16 would provide more sorties per day 
than an expensive fighter. This has certainly been the case in the past. He is quite 
wrong when he starts bandying dollar costs around and thereby creates 'savings'. Neither 
l : YF- 16 nor the F-4 examples he cites can begin to do the job that an F-14 can do. The 
c os ~s and maintenance requirements of the F-14 are grossly overstated, the costs for the 
1·· 4 are understated by a substantial margin and the YF-16 costs are at best paper promises. 
r . orge is absolutely right when he says that the YF-16/YF-17 type of hot rod cannot 
~ .ustitute for an F-14 in Navy missions. It just does not make good operational sense to 
have fighters which are deficient in range or weapons or both. However, George does not 
use the right assumptions when he gets into the cost/effectiveness arguments. If the 
light fighter selected for comparison is no good at any other mission, such as light 
attack, and if it is only purchased in quantities of 400 or so, then it scores very low 
on any cost/effectiveness basis. However, if the Light Fighter selected for comparison 
is a bit larger than the YF-16/YF-17 types, if it carries a Sparrow type weapons system, 
and if it (or a close cousin variant) can also be seen as the A-7 replacement in the 
future, then the cost/effectiveness arguments tilt heavily in its favor. This is precisely 
what the Navy is presently striving for in its VFAX program. 
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Both authors paid little heed to one of the most important facets of all-that of 
carrier suitability. No matter how well an airplane flies and fights, its value to Naval 
Aviation is almost nil unless it works well around the ship. Poor carrier sui tabili ty 
is unacceptable, whether it be a high comeaboard speed, a penchant for exploding tires, 
taking too many bolters and wave-offs, requiring mOre wind over the deck, or excessive 
pilot training, or special handling for armament loading or catapult positioning, or 
elevator spotting, or engine removals, or fuel management, or myriad other facets of that 
very intricate business. It is not merely a matter of making one aircraft work. They 
all have to work together, and they all have to live within the same general limits. 
When anyone requires unique or special treatment, the flexibility and mobility of the 
carrier is diminished, and the overall effectiveness of all the airplanes is commensMrately 
lowered. In recent years, the pendulum has swung far over on the side of special treatment 
for special airplanes, with the RAsC marking the absolute limit of tolerability. Ernie's 
example of a whole deck full of A-4 aircraft is pertinent here. The ship that tries to 
operate that kind of an air wing today would be almost constantly circling into 
the wind for launch and recoveries and would be a sheer disaster area for heavy night 
or weather operations. 
So both authors are right-and both wrong, I think. The Navy needs a new aircraft 
which is carrier suitable, cheap to buy, easy to maintain, capable of doing a lot of 
different missions in all kinds of weather, but which can still be a hot dog in a dogfight. 
The decision facing the Navy is neither a full endorsement of one extreme or the other. 
Instead, the real question is 'Can an aircraft be built which is a compromise of the two 
extremes, but which hasn't been compromised to death in the process?' 
Many qualified and experienced authorities-from aircraft designers through test 
pilots on to hardened combat veterans think that it can be done. They pOint most forcefully 
to the F-4 as a good example of a compromise that worked. In combat, the F-4 has waxed 
the opposition (MIGs 15 thru 21) not because it could out turn them, but because its 
superior pilot could turn it well enough to get by and bring its superior weaponry to bear. 
As an interceptor, in its heyday, the F-4 was great. It remains great in this role, as 
well as in an almost pure attack role, throughout most of the Air Forces of the free 
world. A bad compromise airplane? I don't think so! 
Can another good compromise fighter be developed and built? Of course it can. Can 
the YF-16/YF-17 prototypes be beefed up to meet the Navy requirements? Probably not. 
A better solution is to let the Navy have the lead, build the VFAX to Navy requirements, 
then scale down, not up, for the USAF needs. The Navy has built the two most successful 
tactical aircraft of their era, the F04 and the A-7, and the USAF has had superb service 
from their landbased variants. When you reverse that process, letting the USAF build 
the hot rod and then expect it to be satisfactorily grown into a carrier design, you 
have no precedent for success, and lots of evidence foredamming the effort. In spite 
of this evidence, the OSD paper analysts and the Congress have seen fit to dictate other-
wise. The Navy has been ordered in unmistakable language to accept a YF-16/YF-17 type 
airplane, whether they like it or not, and have even been told not to call it a VFAX, but 
a 'Navy Air Combat Fighter'. I pray that our naval leaders will have enough intestinal 
fortitude to stick by their guns, to remind the analysts and the lawmakers of both the 
F-4 and the F-lll precedents, and to insist that neither the desert warfare experts 
nor the salesmen for hot dog tinkertoys be permitted to design nav~l aircraft of the 
future." 
